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1. INTRODUCTION
The utility of a discussion of legal principles affecting various rights
in territorial waters and the high seas off Georgia's coast is based on
the presumption that future food requirements of the United States and
the world will provide the impetus necessary to surmount political,
engineering and biological impediments that may exist to use of these
areas for mariculture, the artificial culture of marine organisms.
The possibility that United States mariculture entrepreneurs will
encounter limiting international legal rules and political policies is pro-
portional to the distance their facilities are located from their home
shores and to the proximity of such structures to the surface of the sea.
This is because the extent of a coastal nation's sovereignty diminishes
seaward and the greatest potential for conflict with traditional ocean
users exists on or near the surface.
Definitions of mariculture vary according to the intensity of human
effort and capital required. Practices range from an extensive level,
illustrated by the transplantation of organisms such as clams and oys-
ters to improved habitats, to more intensive methods, illustrated by raft
culture of shellfish and culture of free swimming fish in various physical
enclosures which are floated or suspended near the water surface.
In addition to biological requirements inherent in a given enterprise,
a culturist must have appropriate legal control of his growing site. One
authority asserts that where the traditional view is that the sea, its shores
and resources are common property, as in the United States, maricul-
ture is effectively thwarted.' Another report has dismissed serious con-
sideration of "open-ocean" mariculture upon the assumption, based on
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constraining international factors, that such use of the high seas will be
stymied by the state of the international law of the sea at least for the
next fifty years.' Mariculture is seen as less likely to develop in coastal
or ocean waters in some locations due to other competitive uses of these
sites.' The writers do not fully agree with the conclusive tone of these
predictions and will discuss the international legal framework within
which mariculture and other similar new uses must develop.
Mariculture represents a new ocean4 use differing from recognized
uses.5 It requires exclusive use6 of ocean space, a financial investment,
and legal protection for that investment. The security of any financial
investment in the use of the sea for mariculture depends upon the legal
status of such activity.
Mariculture activities are legally distinguishable from existing prac-
tices in ocean areas. As discussed below, mariculture would use the
ocean in a different manner than current practices of fishing,7 naviga-
2R. LANDIS, MARICULTURE: A TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY XI (1971).
1G. TRIMBLE, LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF AN AQUACULTURE POLICY FOR HAWAII
iii (1972).
'See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(b), (c) (1970). "Ocean areas" are defined for the
purposes of this report as the tidal waters and submerged land seaward of the coast line of the
respective states of the United States. The term "coast line" means the line of ordinary low water
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters.
'See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958 [1964] 2
U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 206 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea]: Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as Convention on the High Seas]. The Convention
on the High Seas recognizes four uses of the oceans: navigation, fishing, laying submarine cables,
and overflight. The right to conduct scientific exploration is also impliedly recognized. However,
the listing of expressly recognized uses does not preclude recognition of other uses which are
recognized by the general principles of international law. See generally van Panhuys & van Emde
Boas, Legal Aspects of Pirate Broadcasting, 60 A.J.I.L. 303 (1966).
IM. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1-2 (1962). McDougal and
Burke distinguish the concepts of exclusive and inclusive use:
By an exclusive claim is meant a claim to use or authority over an area or over
specified activities which other states cannot share with the claimant state. By such a
claim, the claimant state commonly asserts a competence to prescribe and/or to apply
its authority to all persons in an area or engaged in certain specified activities, irrespec-
tive of the nationality of the person.
By an inclusive claim is meant a claim to use or authority over an area or over
specified activities which the claimant state can, by some accommodation to avoid
physical interference in use share with another. By such a claim, the claimant state
commonly asserts a competence to prescribe and apply its authority only to its own
nationals, concedes a comparable authority with respect to the area or activities to other
states with respect to their nationals, and demands that other states reciprocally refrain
from the exercise of authority over its nationals and their activities in the area.
Id. at n.I.
7See T. KANE, AQUACULTURE AND THE LAW 60-66 (1970).
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tion, s and mineral exploration and exploitation.' These practices are
internationally recognized ocean uses and have a two-fold relationship
with mariculture: they represent potential conflicts and exemplify ex-
pansion of coastal state jurisdiction over the oceans. Before mariculture
activities or other new practices can be conducted as a matter of right,
they must be reconciled with the existing uses.
The primary focus of this paper will be the State of Georgia and its
ability to authorize mariculture; however, most observations are also
applicable to other states. If differences are present, those differences
will be specifically noted. In this context, three sets of potential competi-
tors exist: foreign governments claiming internationally recognized
rights; 0 United States citizens and officials claiming federal and
international rights;" and Georgia residents and officials claiming state,
federal or international rights."2 State legislation, which purports to
affect any of these interests, must consider all three sets of claimants.
Alternative methods exist by which a mariculture practice may be-
come recognized under international law.' 3 The primary method would
'See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 30 (1957); van Panhuys & van Emde
Boas, supra note 5, at 320. The terms navigation and shipping refer to the movement of vessels in
ocean waters. This definition recognizes the basic distinctions between a mariculture enterprise and
a vessel. Whereas the latter are movable, so that their nationality cannot be made dependent on
their location, a mariculture enterprise will be relatively less mobile and most of them stationary.
9See p. 324 infra.
"See Convention on the Territorial Sea; Convention on the High Seas; Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958 [19661 2 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as Convention on Fishing and Conser-
vation].
"See p. 313 infira.
"See p. 315 infra. A conflict may also arise under Section 91-129 of the Georgia Code, concern-
ing developments resulting in the pollution of water.
'See van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 313-320. McDougal and Burke find three
elements present in resolving conflicts in ocean areas: the process of interaction by which the oceans
are enjoyed, the process of claim by which interests are asserted, and the process of authoritative
decision by which interests are honored and protected. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note
6, at 12-14. Rather than relying upon fixed concepts of existing law, McDougal and Burke feel
that a balancing process more closely approximates the method by which any use is recognized or
disputed. Their balancing test considers the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of use demanded, the
degree of comprehensiveness of authority asserted, and the geographical areas in which such use
and authority are demanded. Id. at 12. This approach provides valuable insight into the possibility
for international acceptance of a "new" use. However, it does not deal expressly with the develop-
ment and/or recognition of a "new" use.
Three distinct views exist upon the question of how a "new" use becomes recognized by the
general principles of international law. Briefly stated, these views are: that every use of the ocean
is permissible unless it runs counter to a specific principle of international law; that any "new"
use is permissible if it does not unjustifiably conflict with already recognized uses and if the practice
has a recognized analogy in existence: and that only uses are permissible as have found some
express recognition in international law. Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 313-
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be legislation enacted by the Georgia legislature. 4 However, questions
exist regarding the authority of the United States and the State of
Georgia to license-or prohibit mariculture activities at various locations.
In ocean waters, the legal authority of the coastal state diminishes as
the activity moves farther seaward from the coastline. 5 To analyze the
authority of the coastal state, five separate ocean areas will be consid-
ered: (I) the territorial waters between the coastal baseline and a line
three miles seaward, (2) the contiguous zone which is that area between
three and twelve miles from the baseline, (3) the high seas beyond twelve
miles, (4) the submerged lands under the territorial sea and (5) the
continental shelf. Authority of the United States and the State of Geor-
gia is most complete in territorial waters and the lands covered
thereby. 6 Competing international claims are minimal in this region.
However, on the continental shelf lands and on the high seas, the United
States and the State of Georgia would license mariculture activities
subject to competing international rights.
A second method would be recognition of mariculture under custom-
ary international law principles. Customary international law refers to
a body of rules followed by states under the conviction that they are
obligatory. 7 Private parties may initiate the development of new princi-
ples of customary international law without the enactment of positive
315. Because no one view adequately summarizes all previous examples, the text will consider all
three views.
However, in arguing for the legal acceptance of a superport facility, Professor Knight cogently
points out that "many of the initial moves toward new legal regimes were accomplished by initia-
tion of a customary rule of international law." HERSHMAN, KNIGHT & MOELLER, Legal Aspects
of a Superport Off Louisiana's Coast, in LOUISIANA SUPERPORT STUDIES, 93-99 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as HERSHMAN].
"See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 253.67-253.75 (Supp. 1969).
"Professors McDougal and Burke summarize the position of the coastal state:
• . . It is apparent, from the perspective of a disinterested observer, that the sea areas
adjacent to a coastal state do reflect a relatively greater degree of concentration of
interest-demands plus supporting expectations about the conditions under which such
demands can be achieved-in the coastal state than in any other state. Among the
interests so concentrated may be observed the more significant and thoroughly accepted
demands for power: control over access to territorial bases of power, defensive measures,
regulation' of activities and maintenance of order in adjacent waters, enforcement of
criminal law: for wealth: exclusive control over disposition of resources, protection of
internal wealth-producing processes; for well-being: resource control, inspection proce-
dures, quarantine, pollution controls; and for enlightenment: scientific investigation and
research.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6 at 9-10.
'"See van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5. The coastal state may be faced with a
problem of denying unwanted users off its coast line. Minor differences exist in the coastal states'
claim of legal authority. However, the general jurisdictional questions are similar.
"L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
[Vol. 4:2
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legislation.'" As discussed below, " an individual may unilaterally act to
establish a mariculture activity. However, this activity will remain sub-
ject to possible regulation by the coastal state or in conflict with foreign
interests."' The following are some of the relevant considerations affect-
ing the establishment of mariculture or other new ocean uses.
II. LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING OCEAN USES
Because legal rules applicable to the conduct of mariculture activities
in the oceans depend upon the location of the activity, this discussion
will focus on the legal regimes in the various locations.
Modern national and international law differentiates ocean areas into
five distinct legal zones: (1) territorial sea, (2) contiguous zone, (3) high
seas, (4) submerged land and (5) continental shelf. National laws differ
on their definitions of these zones."' However, this inquiry focuses pri-
marily upon the United States and, in particular, upon the Georgia
coast.2 The United States, in its treaties23 and in executive pronounce-
"See generally Knight, Shipping Safety Fairways: Conflict Amelioration in the Gulf of Mexico,
I J. MARITIME LAW & COM. 1 (1969). Oil companies began drilling in coastal waters prior to 1940.
They independently initiated a "new" use of ocean space, which use has subsequently been recog-
nized in an Executive Order and in a multilateral treaty. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art.
5(a)-(3), done April 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Continental Shelf]; Truman Proclamation, Pres. Proc. No.
2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (comp. 1943-48), 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945).
'"See p. 334 infra.
""See European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted from Stations Outside
National Territories, effective Oct. 19, 1967, van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 316-
37: Note, Regina v. Kent Justices, 9 HARv. INT'L L.J. 317 (1968).
'See Alexander, Indices of National Interest in the Oceans, I OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INT'L
L.J. 21. 43-47 (1973). The latest State Department tabulation shows 32% of coastal states claiming
territorial waters of three miles, 56% claiming four to twelve miles, and 12% claiming in excess of
twelve miles.
'2The relative legal claims of the coastal state can, to a limited degree, be catalogued according
to geographic limits. However, several qualifications must be noted to this practice. Professors
McDougal and Burke comment:
Such terms as "internal waters," "territorial sea," "contiguous zones," and "high seas"
make both a vague factual reference to varying proximity to coasts and to varying
concentrations of the interests of the coastal and noncoastal states, and a highly techni-
cal, legalistic reference to certain consequences in the allocation of authority between
states which are assumed to inhere in a designation of specified waters as being appropri-
ately subsumed under a particular label. The factual reference is vague both because
there are many different authoritative modes of measurement and measures for fixing
geographical location and because what is important for policy, in choosing between
modes of measurement and measures, is not simple, dead-weight proximity but the
differing degrees of concentration of coastal and non-coastal interests which vary only
roughly with distance from the shore. The technical, legal reference is vague because so
few words cannot adequately describe all the variables and policies which in fact affect
decision or indicate the variety of alternatives open in most contexts to a decision-maker.
For want of better words, we will, however, continue to use the traditional terms to make
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ments,"4 has established that its territorial sea extends from the low-
water mark 5 on the coastline seaward for a distance of three
geographical miles." The contiguous zone extends nine miles seaward
from the outer limit of the territorial sea.27 The high seas means all parts
of the ocean that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal
waters." The submerged land, as that term is used in the Submerged
Lands Act, off the Georgia coast extends seaward for three geographical
miles. 2 The continental shelP ° encompasses the seabed and subsoil of
a rough geographical reference and will trust to context to make our exact meaning
clear.
M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 3, n.7.
':'Convention with Great Britain for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, January
23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761 (1924), T.S. No. 685.
"Statement by Arthur Dean, Chairman United States Delegation, Conference of the Law of the
Sea, Mar. II, 1958, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 574, 576-80 (1958). See also statement by Robert J.
McCloskey, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1970, at 13 col. 3. "The United States does not recognize any
exercise of coastal state jurisdiction over vessels in the high seas and thus does not recognize the
right of any state unilaterally to establish a territorial sea of more than 3 miles or exercise more
limited jurisdiction in any area beyond 12 miles."
"Convention on the Territorial Sea, arts. 3,4 and 7. See Griffin, The Emerging Law of Ocean
Space, I INT'L LAWYER 548, 555-57 (1967). "The normal baseline for measuring the breadth of
the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal State. Elsewhere the baseline is a straight line across rivers, estuaries,
or the mouth of bays or rivers or a system of straight lines between 'appropriate points' along a
coast deeply fringed with islands." Id. at 555. Neither the Submerged Land Act nor the Territorial
Sea Convention defines "low water." In U.S. v. California, the Supreme Court interpreted the
"low water" line to conform to the low water line marked on the official United States coastal
charts prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965). "On
the Atlantic coast the tide is of the semi-daily type and so the nautical charts shows water depths
from the mean of all the low tides as 'mean low water.' " Griffin, supra at 557.
"Alexander, supra note 21, at 43; Note, International Fisheries Regulation 3 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 387, 394 (1973). At the 1971 meeting of the United Nations Seabed Committee, the
United States Government submitted a proposal which would have provided for a twelve mile
maximum breadth of the territorial sea, "free" passage through international straits and a system
of preferential fishing rights for coastal states. U.N. Doc. A/Ac. 138/SC. ll/L.3 (1971). As
Professor Knight notes, this proposal recognizes that the twelve mile limit is emerging as a rule of
customary law regarding the breadth of the territorial sea. HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 90-91.
"Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 24(2).
"xConvention on the High Seas, art. I.
29Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-101 (1971); See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 (1965). But see U.S. v. Louisiana, 363
U.S. I, 30-36 (1960). State jurisdiction over the submerged land area extends from the low water
line to a line three geographical miles distant from the coast line of each state and to the boundary
line of each state where in any case, such boundary as it existed at the time such state became a
member of the union, or as approved by Congress extends beyond three geographical miles.
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970). However, the Submerged Lands Act did not
convey to the states jurisdiction over navigable water. The United States retained all its naviga-
tional rights and powers of regulation over navigable waters, which rights are paramount to the
rights assigned to the states. Id. § 1314. Therefore, by anchoring its facility to submerged lands
and thereby creating a potential hazard to navigation in the surface waters, a mariculture enterprise
will come within both federal and state jurisdictions.
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the submarine areas adjacent to the coast, but outside the area of the
territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that limit where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of exploitation"' of the natural
resources32 of such area. This definition, found in the Convention on
the Continental Shelf, does not make express reference to any specific
geological definition of the continental shelf. The continental shelf also
includes the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to
the coast of islands.3 While an activity may involve more than one
zone, each zone will be considered separately in this analysis.
The question will be raised whether the construction of a mariculture
facility is consistent with the rights appertaining34 to the coastal state
either through international agreements or under customary interna-
tional law and, if such rights exist, the extent to which the coastal state
would be able to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over activities con-
ducted therein. 5
A. Territorial Sea
1. Federal Authority
International conventions provide that the sovereignty" of the
'"Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. I. See also Knight, The Draft United Nations
Conventions on the International Seabed Area: Background, Description and Some Preliminary
Thought, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 459, 463-72 (1971). In his article, Professor Knight documents
the relationship between physical and legal definitions of the continental shelf. Because this paper
focuses on maritime uses only marginally connected to the continental shelf, it will rely on a
jurisdictional rather than a physical definition of the continental shelf.
3 Stang, Wet Land: The Unavailable Resource of the Outer Continental Shelf, 2 J.L. & ECON.
DEVELOPMENT 153, 186 (1967). The Army Corps of Engineers has asserted that the Cortes Bank
(110 miles off the California coast) is part of the Outer Continental Shelf, although this requires
assumption of jurisdiction over an undersea area beyond the 200 meter isobath. This extension of
jurisdiction conforms with the treaty provision that includes areas which admit of exploitation of
natural resources. Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. I.
"Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2. The Convention defines natural resources to
include mineral and other nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living
organisms belonging to sedentary species. A species is sedentary if at the harvestable stage, organ-
isms are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact
with the seabed or subsoil. Id. § 2(4).
"Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1. The Georgia statute defining the boundaries of
the state includes all islands within 20 marine leagues of the seacoast. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-101
(1971).
"
4Truman Proclamation, Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (comp. 1943-48), 13 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 485 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Truman Proclamation]. The term "appertaining" was
chosen because it had not been previously associated with maritime law. The term denotes coastal
state jurisdiction which does not include sovereignty.
3
aHERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 88.
-"Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 315-316. The concept of sovereignty implies
a totality of competences of a state. These competences are not susceptible of an exhaustive
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United States extends over the belt of territorial sea adjacent to its
coast,:"? over the air space above the territorial sea, and over the seabed
and subsoil beneath the territorial sea.', Federal law makes it unlawful
for any vessel, except a vessel of the United States, to engage in fishing
within the territorial waters of the United States. 9 The Fisheries Zone
Act of 1966 extended United States jurisdiction over fishing to a dist-
ance of twelve nautical miles from the low-water line along the coast.4 0
The United States now exercises the same exclusive rights with respect
to fisheries in the contiguous zone as in the territorial sea, subject to
traditional foreign fishing practices as are recognized by the United
States.' Both acts authorize the Secretary of State, with the concurr-
ence of the Secretaries of the Treasury and of the Interior, to permit
foreign vessels to fish within United States territorial waters and/or
within the restricted fisheries zone. 42
enumeration. Nor can they be identified with the concept of "territoriality." As van Panhuys and
van Erde Boas express their concept of sovereignty:
[Tihis plentitude of competences is confined, it is true, within limits laid down by
international law, but at the same time it is one which cannot be exhaustively dissected
into a definite number of component elements. Hence it is only possible to describe a
few of its aspects. Three of such aspects should be mentioned here, as possibly relevant
to the case under consideration:
(a) The first aspect or element is a state's power to perform acts of authority
over persons.
(b) A second aspect is the state's power of disposal over its territory, either
legally, e.g., by abandoning its territory or transferring it to another state, or
factually, namely, by changing the condition of its territory, such as the
reclaiming of bays or lakes or the digging of tunnels.
(c) Thirdly, a state's right to defend or protect itself should be mentioned.
Id. at 316.
"Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. I(]).
"Id. art. 2; C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 91 (6th ed. 1967). The concept
of sovereignty over the territorial sea must be modified to encompass the competing right of
innocent passage and the prohibition against charging tolls. Columbos contends that:
[TIbe modern view (of sovereignty over territorial waters) appears rather to rest on the
basis of a right ofjurisdiction or qualified sovereignty. Such a conception of sovereignty
may not be so extended as to allow exclusive rights of use as in the case of ownership
since the application of any absolute proprietary rights over the territorial sea might
inevitably lead to unacceptable consequences. The claims of a State with a seaboard
should therefore be limited to the exercise of such rights of sovereignty as are necessary
to ensure its security and defense and the protection of interests in its territorial waters,
without excluding the peaceful navigation of foreign vessels through these waters.
Id.
:19Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Territorial Waters of the United States, 16
U.S.C. §§ 108 1-86 (1970).
"'Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970). "The fisheries zone has as its inner boundary
the outer limits of the territorial sea and as its seaward boundary a line drawn so that each point
on the line is nine nautical miles from the nearest point in the inner boundary." Id. § 1092.
hid. § 1091.
121d. § 1091, 1093: Prohibition of Foreign Fishing Vessels in the Territorial Waters of the United
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2. Federal-State Authority
(a) Federal Authority
Under international law and the United States Constitution, the fed-
eral government possesses paramount authority over all waters within
the territorial sea." Article I of the United States Constitution provides
that the Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several states." The commerce clause con-
fers upon Congress the power to regulate navigation and related conduct
within United States waters. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899,11 the Secretary of the Army, acting upon the recommendation of
the Chief of Engineers, must authorize the creation of any obstruction
to navigation. 7 The federal commerce clause power extends beyond
navigation. In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company,48
the Supreme Court held that Congressional authority over navigable
waters is as broad as the needs of commerce. 9 Under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the federal government has
asserted jurisdiction over the territorial seas for purposes of pollution
abatement.50
(b) State Authority
Subject to the federal authority over navigation and commerce, the
states have concurrent jurisdiction over waters in the territorial sea.
Prior to 1948, the states exercised limited jurisdiction over territorial
waters.5 In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that "the Federal Govern-
ment rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that
(three-mile marginal) belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil."5" The Su-
preme Court agreed with the federal government's arguments that the
States, 16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970).
'IT. KANE, supra note 7, at 33-35; cf United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
"U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8.
"Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I (1824).
"Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. (1970).
171d. § 403. See also Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1970). The Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act requires the Corps of Engineers to consult in each instance with
the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior before issuing a permit.
"311 U.S. 377 (1940).
"Id. at 426-27.
5 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp.
II, 1972); amending 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970); see Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401, 86 Stat. 1052 (Supp. 11, 1972).
11C. LEAVELL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF OWNERSHIP AND USE OF ESTUARINE AREAS IN GEORGIA AND
SOUTH CAROLINA 24 (1971).
2United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
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three-mile rule was an incident of national sovereignty, that conduct in
the three-mile zone was a subject of international concern, and that
"insofar as the nation asserts its rights under international law, what-
ever of value may be discovered in the seas next to its shores and within
its protective belt, will most naturally be appropriated for its use." '5 3
Congress later altered this rule by enacting the Submerged Lands Act
of 1953.' The Act is discussed more completely with respect to the
Continental Shelf.15 The Submerged Lands Act, in effect, quitclaimed
the federal claim to ownership to submerged lands under the territorial
sea:
(I) The United States releases and relinquishes unto said States and
persons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title,
and interest of the United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands,
improvements, and natural resources; (2) the United States releases
and relinquishes all claims of the United States, if any it has, for
money or damages arising out of any operations of said States or
persons pursuant to State authority upon or within said lands and
navigable waters. 5
Nevertheless, a question remains with respect to the extent the Sub-
merged Lands Act recognized state jurisdiction over the waters in the
territorial sea. 57 The Submerged Lands Act does not diminish federal
control of the territorial waters for the purposes of navigation, flood
control, or the production of water power. 58 As noted above, it expressly
;-,Id. at 35.
51Suhmerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
:
5
,See p. 336 infra.
5
"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1970).
"See generallv LEAVELL, supra note 51, at 24. But see HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 89. In the
Louisiana Superport Studies, the authors conclude that "there are no significant state-federal legal
problems in this area since pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act coastal states in the United
States were granted title to the submerged lands lying within three miles of the coastline." Id.
However, the Submerged Lands Act only conveyed federal right, title and interest in "lands,
improvements and natural resources." Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 131 I(b) (1970). The
Act dealt only with the then existing state claims. Future state claims, whether for a superport or
a mariculture activity, are not expressly included within the conveyance of right, title and interest.
Because mariculture does not involve exploitation of existing natural resources and requires use
of the water column, the potential for intergovernmental conflict exists.
"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 131 l(d) (1970): United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127
(1967). The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1970) provides:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the constitutional purposes
of commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, all of of which shall
be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of ownership,
or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands
and natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and
rested in and assigned to the respective states. . ..
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recognizes state ownership of natural resources. 9 The term "natural
resources" in this context includes oil, gas, and all other minerals, and
fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, lobsters, sponges, kelp, and other marine
animal and plant life. It does not include water power, or the use of
water for the production of power.6" The broad language in the grant
of authority implies that Congress intended for the states to have a
proprietary right for other non-excluded purposes as far as the state's
boundary extends.' However, Congress did not expressly include fed-
eral regulation of fisheries by this grant. In ruling upon the application
of state law in the high seas pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act,62 the Fifth Circuit commented that the "Continental Shelf
Act was enacted for the purpose, primarily of asserting ownership of
and jurisdiction over the minerals in and under the Continental
Shelf."63 Commentators have analogized this treatment to the Sub-
merged Lands Act.64 However, the definition of natural resources appar-
ently encompasses more than merely mineral resources. 5
(c) Limitations on State Authority
State governments control the territorial waters subject to powers
exercised under the Constitution and federal statutes. Since Congress
has occupied only a limited portion of the field of marine regulation,
the authority of the states to protect their interests by additional legisla-
tion is not impaired.66 However, state statutes may not unjustifiably
hinder interstate commerce.67 In Pike v. Bruce Church," the Supreme
5 Suhmerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1) (1970).
1111d. § 1301 (e).
"'LEAVELL, supra note 51, at 24-25; see T. KANE, supra note 7, at 34-35. Kane suggests that the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted the states exclusive authority over fishing within the state
boundaries, in the absence of conflicting congressional legislation. He cites Corsa v. Texas for the
proposition that regulation of the coastal fisheries is within the police power of the individual states.
Corsa v. Texas, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957), affd, 355 U.S. 37 (1958).
2Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
"aGuess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961). In Guess, the court was asked to construe the
Louisiana Direct Action Statute. The court found the legislative intent to be that an action could
be maintained against an insurer if the accident occurred in a parish of Louisiana. The court held
that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act did not extend state law into the high seas for purposes
unrelated to mineral exploitation.
"'See Stang, supra note 31. at 165-66.
"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970).
"Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69, 75 (1940); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350 (1932) Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137. 147-50 (1902).
"Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761 (945); Seaboard Airline R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 316 (1917). But see South
Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). A general test was stated
by Justice Stone in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona. supra. The commerce clause leaves "to the
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Court used the following test in evaluating a state enactment:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
State statutes may not conflict with federal legislation or
regulations.70 However, Congress has not enacted preemptive legislation
regulating state fisheries in territorial waters.7 In Askew v. The Ameri-
can Waterways Operators, Inc.," the Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of whether a Florida statute conflicted with the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970.11 Applying a test similar to the one outlined
in Pike, the Court found no collision between the federal and state
legislation.74 Florida had a recognizable and distinct interest in its own
clean-up costs after an oil spill.75 Read broadly, this case indicates a
willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to construe federal and
state legislation so as to minimize potential conflicts.
States have the recognized ability to control their citizens in the ex-
ploitation of fisheries in ocean waters.7" Regulation of the coastal fisher-
ies is within the police power of the individual states. In Skiriotes v.
Florida," the Supreme Court held that Florida could govern the conduct
states wide scope for regulation of matters of local concern, even though it in some measure affects
the commerce, provided it does not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines,
or interfere with it in matters with respect to which uniformity of regulations is of predominant
national concern." Id. at 770. This test does not define what are material restrictions; rather this
resolution is left for case by case analysis.
"397 U.S. 137 (1970).
"Id. at 142.
7'U.S. CONST. art. VI.7
'See T. KANE, supra note 7, at 34-35: cf Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 33 U.S.C. .§ 1251(b), 1253, 1319, 1328 (Supp. 11, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. 1161 (1970),
Marine Protection, Research, and Santuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1402 (c), 1402 (0, 1412(a),
1441, and 1442 (Supp. II, 1972); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, §§ 303, 306(c), 306(e),
Pub. L. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280. In the recent statutes, Congress has expressly recognized interest in
the preservation and conduct of coastal fisheries. Pursuant to this national interest, Congress has
undertaken to regulate the conduct of private persons and state governments. If state governments
desire to receive federal grants, they must enact a plan that adequately considers regional and
national requirements. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, §§ 306(c), 306(e), Pub. L. 92-583,
86 Stat. 1280. However, Congress has not expressly regulated fisheries.
72411 U.S. 325 (1973). This case is discussed at 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 216 (1974).
73Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. (1970).
11411 U.S. at-336.
75,Id.
I'Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75-77 (1941); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240,
266 (1891).
17313 U.S. at 69.
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of one of its citizens in his activities upon the high seas7" with respect to
matters in which the state had a legitimate interest.79 This holding recog-
nized the control that a state may exercise over its citizens and boats
licensed in that state.'"
The extent of state control and jurisdiction over fisheries in the terri-
torial sea remains unsettled. Conflict over this question has arisen in the
context of a state's right to exclude aliens and residents of other states.8'
The power to exclude has been based upon the theories of ownership and
conservation. In McCready v. Virginia," the Supreme Court said that
"the States own the tide-waters, and the fish in them, so far as they are
capable of ownership while running." 3 However, the decision in
"Id. at 77. The conduct in question took place at a point approximately two marine leagues (six
nautical miles) from the mean low tide line of Florida waters. Id. at 70.
71d. at 77: accord. Felton v. Hodges, 374 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1967).
1313 U.S. at 77. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes argued that:
If the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high seas, we
see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the conduct of its citizens
upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has legitimate interest and
where there is no conflict with acts of Congress. Save for the powers committed by the
Constitution to the Union, the State of Florida has retained the status of a sovereign.
Id.
"'Compare Dobard v. Texas, 149 Tex. 332, 233 S.W.2d 435 (1950) with Bruce v. Director of the
Chesapeake. 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971). The Texas Supreme Court found an exclusionary
Texas fishing statute to be unconstitutional. The statute was pronounced invalid as denying nonres-
idents equal protection of the law. Although conservation measures are a proper limitation on use
of fisheries, the Texas statute failed to achieve its designated conservation purpose. In Bruce. the
Maryland Court of Appeals partially invalidated a Maryland statute restricting the harvesting of
oysters to residents of each tidewater county. The court indicated, as dicta, that a state may exclude
nonresidents. 276 A.2d at 212.
.294 U.S. 391 (1876).
011d. at 394. The court held that Virginia might exclude a Maryland resident, McCready, from
planting oysters in the Ware River, a stream in which the tide ebbs and flows. The Supreme Court
justified Virginia's right as follows:
The principle has long been settled in this court, that each State owns the beds of all
tidewaters within its jurisdiction unless they have been granted away [citations omitted].
In like manner, the States own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish, in them, so far
as they are capable of ownership while running. For this purpose, the State represents
its people, and the ownership is that of the people in their united sovereignty [citation
omitted]. The title thus held is subject to the paramount right of navigation, the regula-
tion of which, in respect to foreign and inter-state commerce, has been granted to the
United States. There has been, however, no such grant of power over the fisheries. These
remain under the exclusive control of the State, which has consequently the right, in its
discretion, to appropriate its tide-waters and their beds to be used by its people as a
common for taking and cultivating fish, so far as it may be done without obstructing
navigation. Such an appropriation is in effect nothing more than a regulation of the use
by the people of their common property. The right which the people of the State thus
acquire comes not from their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property
combined. It is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of
citizenship.
Id. at 394-95.
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McCready related to oysters which would remain in Virginia until re-
moved by men and involved regulation of fishing in internal waters."
Subsequent decisions have questioned but not overturned McCready.5
The states may enact conservation measures to preserve existing fish
stocks in the absence of federal preemption in the same field.86
State regulation under either theory must not conflict with the United
States Constitution. The privileges and immunities clause and the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment limit attempts at exclu-
sionary legislation. These clauses do not permit classifications based
upon the fact of non-citizenship unless there is something to indicate
that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the
statute is aimed.8 7 In Toomer v. Witsel88 and Takahashi v. Fish and
Game Commission,s8 the Supreme Court considered the state ownership
theory in the context of federal constitutional principles. The states
involved were found to have the right to discriminate against non-
citizens to the extent justified by valid9" conservation measures.9 As
stated in Toomer:
The whole ownership theory. . .is now generally regarded as but a
fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people
that a State have a power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
any important resource. And there is no necessary conflict between
that vital policy consideration and the constitutional command that the
State exercise that power like its other powers, so as not to discrimi-
nate without reason against citizens of other States."
"Id.
""Conipare Dobard v. Texas, 149 Tex. 332, 233 S.W.2d 435 (1950) with Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 408-09 (1948) (J. Frankfurter concurring opinion) and Bruce v. Director of the Chesa-
peake, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1970).
"Dobard v. Texas, 149 Tex. 332, 233 S.W.2d 435 (1950). Rhode Island and Massachusetts have
both enacted conservation measures to preserve marine fisheries resources between mean high tide
and a line extending seaward for 200 miles. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 17(10) (Supp. 1973);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 20-36-I (Supp. 1973). These extended claims have not yet been challenged
in court.
"Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
"Id.
"Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
'"See Dobard v. Texas, 149 Tex. 332, 339, 233 S.W.2d 435, 440 (1950). Any limitation based
upon citizenship must be directly related to maintaining the desired quantity of fish.
"Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). The Supreme Court stated the test:
But it (the privileges and immunities clause) does not preclude disparity of treatment
in many situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the
inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether
the degree of discrimination bears a close relation to them.
Id.
92334 U.S. at 402. See generally Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
[Vol. 4:2
MARICULTURE: A NEW OCEAN USE
Mariculture legislation must similarly conform to the same constitu-
tional standards. The Submerged Lands Act provides that the states
have title and ownership to fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, and other mar-
ine animals. "3 Various states have exercised extensive control over
shellfish.94 Currently, shellfish production is directly related to state
conservation efforts such as limitations on harvesting, redistribution of
shells and maintenance of natural beds." Mariculture enterprises will
require similar investments of state or private money. Any unlicensed
exploitation would endanger the success of a mariculture enterprise. For
these reasons mariculture enterprises parallel shellfish cultivation in
terms of its required legal environment. The requirements of state or
private investment and the confinement necessary in mariculture activi-
ties differentiate this enterprise from shrimping or other traditional
forms of fishing.
The Submerged Lands Act permits the states to license mariculturists
within the limits of territorial waters. Congress determined that state
management, administration, development, leasing and use of the natu-
ral resources on or above navigable waters was in the national interest."
As mentioned above, the statute expressly contemplated state control
over fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, and other marine animals found in
territorial waters. Congress used general, common terms rather than
specific species designation to indicate the broad scope of state author-
ity. 7 The notion of expansive state control is supported by the last
phrase in the listing, "other marine animals."" This general phrase
appears broad enough to cover any mariculture project that can fall
under the specific classification. 9 Thus, a state may lease land and the
adjacent water column for mariculture practices and may exclude all
nonlicensed persons from fishing within areas leased for mariculture
"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970).
"J, SMITH, MARICULTURE AND THE LAW (to be published 1974). This work, of which this article
is a part, expressly discusses state shellfish laws in one section.
9"See Power, More About Oysters Than You Wanted To Know, 30 MD. L. REv. 198 (1970).
"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1970).
7 For example, Congress used the term "fish." Congress did not expressly indicate what kinds
of "fish" were meant or whether any kind of "fish" was not meant. The other terms in the statute
are equally broad.
'"Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1970).
"This interpretation realizes the limits of the ejusdem generis rule. Under that rule, if general
works in a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, then the general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent and are limited only to persons or things of the same general
class or kind as those specifically mentioned. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (4th ed. 1951).
However, the initial terms in this statute, those preceding the general phrase, are themselves
extremely general. For this reason, a court would likely construe the statute broadly enough to
permit state licensing of mariculturists.
1974]
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purposes."" Pursuant to its general welfare police powers, a state may
regulate who shall receive a lease and upon what terms.
(d) Limitations on the Coastal Nation
Although the term "sovereignty" is used to indicate the degree of
control a nation-state has over the territorial sea, such authority is
limited by the competing rights of navigation and entry in distress.'"' By
excluding access to other potential users of the territorial sea, a maricul-
ture activity may conflict with a ship's right to innocent passage. Inno-
cent passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the pur-
pose of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, proceeding
to internal waters, or making for the high seas from internal waters. It
includes stopping and anchoring in so far as the same are incidental to
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary because of force majeure
or distress.""
The right to innocent passage reflects a compromise between a gen-
eral world community policy of maintaining the oceans as a common
resource and the coastal states' interests in power, wealth and well-
being.'10 Concern for innocent passage is only present in discussion of
the territorial sea because it is only in this zone that the coastal state
has such authority. 04 The coastal state has a recognized interest in
protecting the well-being of its nationals by such means as restricting
fishing, establishing navigation routes, and enforcing health and safety
measures in this marginal sea.'0 5 Thus, the right to innocent passage can
be considered as a limitation on the coastal state's right to exercise
"sovereignty." The weight accorded to each State's claim will vary
depending on the strategic location of the territorial sea, the available
alternative routes, the extent of interference with navigation, and other
factors important to the coastal state.'0
The general rule requires that the coastal state must not hamper
innocent passage through the territorial sea.' 07 Two limitations restrict
this general rule. First, passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudi-
cial to "peace, good order or security of the coastal state."'0° In adopt-
"°See Ft A. STAT. ANN. 253.67-253.75 (Supp., 1969).
"Convention on the Territorial Sea, arts. 14-17.
"-Id. art. 14.
":1M. McDoUGA. & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 184-86.
'"See id. at 186.
""See Cunard S.S. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923); M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6,
at 9: Note, Fishing Vessels and the Principle of Innocent Passage, 48 A.J.I.L. 627 (1954).
"'"M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 186.
""Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 15.
""Id. art. 14(4).
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ing this limitation, the Law of the Sea Conference gave no specific
operational guides to these terms.'09 At the very least, these limitations
require that the coastal state demonstrate a conflict with internationally
recognized interests rather than specific national interests accorded
great importance solely by the coastal state. Second, the general rule
of innocent passage is limited by the requirement that foreign ships must
comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal state in
conformity with international law."" McDougal and Burke suggest
weighing the following indices to determine whether restrictions im-
posed by the coastal state unduly hamper innocent passage: (I) the
consequentiality and range of the interests sought to be protected by the
coastal state; (2) the scope of the authority claimed; (3) the importance
of the area claimed for inclusive use; (4) the intensity of the impact upon
coastal interests and (5) alternative sanctions available for coastal pro-
tection."'
The United States currently regulates innocent passage by legislation
and by agreements affecting navigation. The Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone provides that foreign ships exercis-
ing the right of innocent passage shall comply with laws and regulations
enacted by the coastal state."' An analysis of two regulations may
demonstrate the relationships among the right of innocent passage, the
national interest being protected, and the scope of authority that the
United States may claim. Both the Regulations Preventing Collisions
at Sea" 3 and the Shipping Safety Fairways Agreement"' control navi-
gation by American and foreign vessels. Congress has adopted the Inter-
national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and enacted the
Regulations into positive law." 5 The Regulations provide that:
All vessels not engaged in fishing . . . shall when under way, keep out
of the way of vessels engaged in fishing. This Rule shall not give to
any vessel engaged in fishing the right of obstructing a fairway used
by vessels other than fishing vessels."'
'"IM. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 252.
""Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 17.
'M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 229.
"'Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 17.
"'international Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, [19651 I U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
5813 [hereinafter cited as Regulations].
"'See Griffin, supra note 25, at 578-83 (1967): Knight, supra note 18. See also Griffin, Ocean
Navigation Fairway's Through Gulf of Mexico 'Oilfields', 44 INT'L HYDROGRAPHIC REV. 177
(1967).
"'Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 33 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1970).
"1ld. § 1088.
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The Regulations define the term "engaged in fishing" to mean fishing
with nets, lines or trawls." 7 The definition expressly excludes fishing
with trolling nets." 8 Whether a mariculture activity would be considered
as fishing is not settled. Kane concludes that "aquaculture established
under the authority of the state will almost certainly be held in future
decisions to be a 'fishery' for purposes of state regulation."'"' However,
fishing operations are transient, passing through portions of the ocean.
A mariculture enterprise would involve exclusive use of a limited por-
tion of the ocean for extended periods of time. For navigational consid-
erations, a mariculture activity would more closely approximate a per-
manent obstruction such as an oil derrick rather than a fishing vessel.
Navigational routes will have to be permanently adjusted to reflect the
presence of the mariculture activity, or such practices will be wisely
located out of established navigational routes.
Regardless of the classification of mariculture, the navigational regu-
lations will apply. As discussed above, all vessels are obligated to
exercise reasonable care to avoid collisions at sea. 20 Vessels are obli-
gated to navigate around less maneuverable vessels, such as fishing
ships. A mariculture enterprise would create a similar burden on naviga-
tion. Vessels under way would be required to steer around the maricul-
ture operation. Moreover, mariculture activities could be marked on all
Coast and Geodetic Survey charts to provide a reliable guide to naviga-
tion around such structures. Because the presence of the structure would
be predictable and its location static, the mariculture enterprise would
appear to cause less danger of collision than would a moving vessel.
The Shipping Safety Fairways in the Gulf of Mexico are another
limitation on the right of innocent passage. Shipping Safety Fairways
are areas in which the Department of the Army has not granted permits
for structures and does not intend to grant permits."' Shipping is not
required to use the fairways; however, the shipping lanes provide safer
access to Gulf ports. 22
In collisions at sea, liability is based on fault.2 3 A finding of fault
presupposes a standard of correct action.' Professors Gilmore and
Black list the following sources for establishing a standard of conduct:
"l1d. § 1061(c)(xiv).
I I'id.
"IT. KANE, supra note 7, at 35.
111G. Gil-MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 399.
'Griffin, supra note 25, at 583.
"lid. at 581.
11:1G. Gil-MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 396.
'
241d. at 398.
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the statutory Rules of Navigation, other statutes and regulations having
the force of statutes, proved local "customs" not contradicting either
of the above, and the requirements of good seamanship and due care. 2"
In the event of a collision outside a fairway, it is likely the courts will
recognize the concept of shipping lanes.' 6 Failure to remain within the
lanes may be considered as evidence of negligence. Location of new uses
such as mariculture structures away from recognized shipping lanes
should decrease the likelihood of interference with such existing uses.
Mariculture entrepreneurs can not, by analogy to oil exploration re-
lated physical obstructions, gain acceptance for their facilities.2 " Oil
drilling operations are logically connected to a particular space on the
continental shelf. The oil derrick must be located in close proximity to
the oil field. Mariculture activities lack this recognized nexus to the
continental shelf.' However, the Shipping Safety Fairways demon-
strate the balancing process between two competing ocean
uses-navigation and mineral exploration. Rather than giving either
right absolute priority, this practice accommodates both uses. This con-
flict could be similarly reconciled by mariculture licensing practices. As
the potential for conflict is minimized, the possibility for acceptance of
mariculture is enhanced.
In conclusion, the State of Georgia may license mariculture activities
in territorial waters off the Georgia coast. However, any license will be
subject to approval by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.
Domestic and foreign shipping industries may complain that maricul-
ture facilities have impeded their right to innocent passage. The resolu-
tion of this potential conflict will depend upon the factors listed above.2 9
In the particular, the outcome will depend on the location of the mari-
culture facility relative to navigational lanes, the size of the facility and
the benefit derived from the facility.
'11d. at 398-99.
'
2
'Grilflin, supra note 25, at 581.
'Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 635 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 388 U.S. 957 (1962); Convention
on the Continental Shelf, art. 2. The Continental Shelf Convention recognized the coastal state's
authority over the shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. Fish
and other mobile marine species are not included within the definition of natural resources. In
Guess the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the United States Outer Continental Shelf
L.ands Act to permit ownership of and jurisdiction over minerals in and under the continental shelf.
This approach would hold that fish are not natural resources under the convention.
'See generally HERSIMAN, supra note 13, at 95.
'nSee p. 322 supra. These factors are (1) the consequentiality and range of the interests sought
to he protected by the coastal state, (2) the scope of the authority claimed, (3) the importance of
the area claimed for inclusive use, (4) the intensity of the impact upon coastal interests, and (5)
alternative sanctions available for coastal protection.
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B. Contiguous Zone
I. Federal Authority
International law recognizes the right of the United States to exercise
sufficient control over the contiguous zone to protect its national inter-
ests. " " The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
specifically recognizes the authority of the coastal state to prevent in-
fringement of customs, fiscal, sanitary or immigration regulations. 31
The United States has declared an exclusive fishing zone within the
contiguous zone and justified the action as a necessary step to protect
the domestic fishing industry and to conserve existing fish stocks. Al-
though exclusive fishing rights are exercised, they remain subject to
those historic fishing claims "as may be recognized by the United
States."' 32 Although the United States may regulate domestic
fishermen and exclude foreign fishermen, the question remains whether
the United States can authorize a mariculture project in the contiguous
zone.
The United States can license mariculture in the contiguous zone. 33
Mariculture practices resemble a fishery for international law pur-
poses. 4 Because the United States already controls the use of fisheries
in the contiguous zone, it should also be able to create additional fisher-
ies. This rationale coincides with the notion of protection of national
interests. The United States would be augmenting domestic food stocks,
a matter vital to national well-being. A further rationale supporting
United States authority is the inability of a foreign nation to effectively
'"See generallv Griffin, supra note 25, at 583-85.
'Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. 24(l).
116 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970). See generally Griffin, supra note 25, at 585. This provision was
intended to put the United States in a position to negotiate permanent agreements with foreign
states for the reciprocal recognition of historic fisheries.
The United States has negotiated a series of agreements with Japan recognizing Japanese fishing
rights in the contiguous zone. Agreement with Japan Regarding the King and Tanner Crab Fisher-
ies in the Eastern Bering Sea, Dec. 11, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2734, T.I.A.S. 7019; Agreement with
Japan Concerning Certain Fisheries off the Coast of the United States, Dec. II, 1970, [1970] 3
U.S.T. 2746, T.I.A.S. 7020: Agreement with Japan Relating to Salmon Fishing in Water Contig-
uous to the United States Territorial Sea, Dec. II, 1970, [19701 3 U.S.T. 2746, T.I.A.S. 7020.
See also Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Fishery Problems on
the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, Jan. I, 1969, [1968] 6 U.S.T.
7661, 7664. T.I.A.S. 6603.
:'Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. 1973), amend-
ing 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1948).
"'See T. KANE, supra note 7, at 35. Kane feels that"... aquaculture established under the
authority of the state will almost certainly be held in future decisions to be a 'fishery' for purposes
of state regulation." Id. The classification of aquaculture for international law purposes will likely
resemble the classification found in the federal-state context.
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protest a federal mariculture lease. Almost all foreign activity is already
excluded from the contiguous zone. Foreign shipping and navigation
and the right of innocent passage would have to be resolved as in the
territorial sea. However, a note of caution should be introduced. A
United States law granting leases in the contiguous zone might be
viewed by other nations as an attempt by the United States to extend
its sovereignty. Although such an extension would not be objectiona-
ble,"'' it might inadvertently extend the United States territorial limit
to twelve miles.' :1'
2. State Authority
An unresolved question remains concerning the states' jurisdiction in
the contiguous zone. Congressional legislation has extended the control
that the federal government exercises over the contiguous zone. 37 Kane
contends that this extension of federal jurisdiction has retained or
preserved the states' rights in the zone.' The Fisheries Zone Act pro-
vides that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending the jurisdiction of
the States to the natural resources beneath and in the waters within
the fisheries zone established by this Act or as diminishing their juris-
diction to such resources beneath and in the waters of the territorial
sea of the United States. 139
State governments currently possess limited jurisdiction over the con-
tiguous zone. Their authority is less than in the territorial sea with
respect to jurisdiction over nonresidents and natural resources. How-
ever, the states have the right to govern the conduct of their citizens
upon the high seas with respect to those matters in which the State has
a recognized interest. 4' Kane argues that the states' conduct of fisheries
and mariculture enterprises in the contiguous zone may be allowed.'
':"See M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 565-66; Alexander, supra note 21. A claim
to a twelve mile territorial sea would simply align the United States with other nations which have
already claimed such a limit. The validity of such an extended claim must always be considered
relative to the interests of the United States Department of Defense. See Knight, Non-Extractive
Uses of the Seabed, 6 MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY JOURNAL 18 (1972).
":116 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 1257, 86 Stat. 816 (1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 1161
(1948): 33 U.S.C. 1401, 1402(b) 86 Stat. 1052 (1972).
"'See Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat.
1052, § 302(g) (1972). In the ocean dumping legislation, the United States expressly refrains from
asserting jurisdiction over foreign nationals outside the territorial sea.
"'T. KANE, supra note 7, at 30-33.
''Fisheries Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. 1091-94 (1970).
""See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See generally Am. Waterways Operators v.
Askew, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
'"T. KANE, supra note 7, at 31-33. See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
1974]
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3. Law of the Sea Conference
The Law of the Sea Conference' may render moot many of the
questions of federal and state authority. The United States has
announced its support for a 12 mile territorial limit.'43 If the United
States, either through a multilateral convention or through unilateral
action, extended the territorial sea to 12 miles, then domestic law would
govern the licensing of mariculture projects. Current domestic law ap-
pears to give the states authority out to three miles and the federal
government authority from three to twelve miles.' The Submerged
Lands Act expressly limits state authority at a three mile limit, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act confers no additional authority
upon the states and the Fisheries Act expressly negates any extension
of state authority. This conclusion is supported by the decision in Union
Oil Co. v. Minier,45 regarding federal leases in the outer continental
shelf. When the federal government has exerted its authority, either
directly or through private persons, then the states must give way.'
of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1328, (Supp. II, 1972), amending 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970); Marine Protec-
tion, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972). Recent
federal laws lend support to Kane's argument. The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act applies to ocean waters, which are defined to mean waters in the contiguous zone. Provisos in
the Act expressly excludes aquaculture authorized under federal or state authority and the deposit
of oyster shells or other materials "when such deposit is made for the purpose of developing,
maintaining, or harvesting fisheries resources and is otherwise regulated by Federal or State law
or occurs pursuant to an authorized federal or State program." See 33 U.S.C. § 1402(f), (Supp.
II, 1972): 33 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
2See G.A. Res. 2750 C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 25, U.N. Doc. (1970).
r3Statement by President Nixon, White House Press Release, May 23, 1970; see Ratner, United
States Ocean Policy, 2 J. MARITIME L. & COM. 225, 245-46 (1971).
"'Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). But see HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 92-93; T. KANE, supra note 3, at 32-
33. Kane qualifies his remarks by noting that the federal government may dispute and deny the
state's authority. Professor Knight does not consider the contiguous zone as a separate jurisdic-
tional area. He postulates two possible alternatives: either the territorial sea will be expanded to
twelve miles or it will remain at three miles. The contiguous zone between three miles and twelve
miles will be governed by the legal regime present in the territorial seas or on the high seas.
HERSIMAN, supra note 13, at 92-93.
15437 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1970).
"1d. at 411. But see Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251 et. seq. (Supp. II, 1972) amending 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970). However, the Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments provide that states, political subdivisions, and interstate agencies retain
the right to set more restrictive standards and limitations than those imposed under this Act. These
standards may effect conduct in the contiguous zone. Id. § 1370. For example, state pollution laws
may restrict federally licensed mariculture projects in the contiguous zone, if the mariculture
project threatened irreparable harm to recognized state interests. See American Waterways Opera-
tors v. Askew, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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C. High Seas
I. Coastal State Authority
Existing international law regarding conduct on the high seas is gener-
ally found in the Convention on the High Seas.'47 Neither customary
international law nor the Convention on the High Seas expressly recog-
nizes nor prohibits the practice of mariculture on the high seas. 4 , The
terms of this convention, however, would limit the acceptance or recog-
nition of mariculture practices on the high seas. Relative to this conven-
tion, it is important to note that, in most conceivable instances, maricul-
ture practices in these ocean areas would require use of a relatively small
area.
Two general themes appear throughout the Convention on the High
Seas. The first is the policy of nonexclusive use. According to various
provisions, no state may validly subject any part of the high seas to its
sovereignty,'49 they are to remain open to all nations,'m and all states
are entitled to use them.' 5 ' Subsequent United Nations General
Assembly resolutions have reiterated the theme by providing that no
state may appropriate or exercise sovereignty over the seabed and ocean
floor in the area beyond national jurisdiction.'52 However, each state
may exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals and ships in this area.5 3
Another theme in the Convention is the right to make reasonable use
of the high seas. The Convention on the High Seas specifically recog-
nizes the use of these areas for navigation, fishing, the laying of submar-
"'Convention on the High Seas.
"'Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 253, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956). One interpretation of existing international law would
prevent any mariculture activities on the high seas. The International Law Commission gave a
narrow interpretation in its commentary to the draft article of the Continental Shelf Convention
which permits the construction of structures on the continental shelf:
To lay down . . . that the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf must
never result in any interference whatsoever with navigation and fishing might result in
many cases in rendering somewhat nominal both the sovereign rights of exploration and
exploitation and the very purpose of the articles as adopted. The case is clearly one of
assessment of the relative importance of the interest involved. Interference, even if
substantial, with navigation and fishing might, in some cases be justified. On the other
hand, interference even on an insignificant scale would be unjustified if unrelated to
reasonably conceived requirements of exploration and exploitation of the continental
shelf.
Id. at 299.
"'Convention on the High Seas, art. 2; see n. 36 supra.
" Convention on the High Seas, art. 2.
"'Id. art. 3.
"
2G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 28, at 24 A/8208 (1970).
"'Griffin, supra note 25, at 686.
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ine cables and pipelines, overflight, and other uses, "which are recog-
nized by the general principles of international law."'54 These uses are
conditioned upon the requirement that they "be exercised by all States
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of the freedom of the high seas."'' 15 Therefore, a mariculture project
could never be justified that would unreasonably interfere with other
existing uses.
Given the general limits set forth in the Convention on the High Seas,
the following analysis considers some possible international legal bar-
riers to acceptance of mariculture on the high seas. Three major objec-
tions immediately appear: (I) that the claim to exclusive use of the
ocean is really a claim of extended national sovereignty; (2) that mari-
culture is not an ocean use recognized by "general principles of
international law;" and (3) that mariculture will unreasonably interfere
with existing ocean uses.
2. Private Nongovernmental Authority
In light of the general rule that no State has a right to exercise
sovereignty over the high seas,' 51 two questions arise: what constitutes
an exercise of sovereignty and can a mariculture project be regarded as
an attempt to establish such authority? One approach to defining the
term sovereignty would be to compare and contrast the use of that term
in the other Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf states that the coastal state
exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 57 Within the area of
recognized authority, a coastal state exercises authority comparable to
the authority it exercises over its national land mass in that it may
totally exclude nonnationals. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone provides that the sovereignty of a coastal state
extends to the outer limit of its territorial sea. '5 The term sovereignty,
in this context, has been applied to give coastal states the authority to
legislate with respect to conduct in the territorial sea and to exclude non-
nationals. 59 Although no provision directs that these Geneva Conven-
tions be construed in pari materia, an international arbitral or judicial
tribunal would be likely to construe them together. If such a method of
':"Convention on the High Seas, art. 2.
'"'Id.
'r"Id.
' Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2.
' Convention on the Territorial Sea, art. I.
''
9See generally Fisheries Zone Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. 1 091-94 (1970).
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construction were employed, the term sovereignty in the Convention on
the High Seas would refer to the authority of a state to administer or
police a region of the high seas, to deny access to foreign nationals and
to proclaim exclusive competence in that region. Relying upon a similar
concept of sovereignty, Thomas Kane concluded that the United States
could not make a claim of sovereignty to an area of the high seas being
used for mariculture. 60
Having defined the term sovereignty to mean exercise of near abso-
lute authority over large areas of the sea and continental shelf, the
practice of mariculture is not necessarily excluded from the high seas.
A mariculture project would require enclosing a portion of the ocean
and excluding other users. However, various nations and individuals
have already successfully asserted their rights to exclusive use of por-
tions of the high seas without creating zones of national "sovereignty."
Unilateral actions, similar to those proposed for mariculture, have been
taken in restricting access to the high seas. The United States has, in
the past, limited access to high seas areas for relatively brief periods
during testing of nuclear weapons.' 6' Private deepwater lobster fishing
activities have limited other users in some high seas areas.'62 The lobster
practices, in particular, conflict with fishing done by trawlers. 63 These
claims have been respected by foreign interests.6 4 International recogni-
tion of claims has depended, in part, on the justification offered for the
claim. 1'65 In this context a mariculturist could conduct his activities on
the high seas without being barred as attempting to claim sovereignty.'
1"T. KANE, supra note 7, at 26. See also Note, Jurisdictional Problems Created By Artificial
Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 638, 650-51 (1973).
6 T. KANE, supra note 7, at 62; McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International
Law of the Sea, 49 A.J.I.L. 356, 357 (1955).
"
2Windley and Blondin, Issues Raised by the Attachment of the Suleyman Stalskiy, 4 J. MARI-
TIME L. & CoM. 141 (1972). Deepwater lobster fishing practices are of relatively recent origins.
The northeast lobster fishery began in 1952. Thus, like mariculture, the introduction of lobster pots
into the high seas represented a "new" ocean use.
'"Vd. at 142.
'"I1d. at 145. The Soviet government paid $89,000 for damage caused when a Soviet trawler
destroyed lobster pots owned by an American Company.
"ISM. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 764-5.
"See T. KANE, supra note 7, at 65. See generally Note, The Establishment of Mandatory
Sealanes by Unilateral Action, 22 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 108 (1972). But see Note, supra note 150,
at 651-52. As a general rule of international law, a country may assert jurisdiction whenever its
assertion does not conflict with a principle of international law. International practice has recog-
nized the authority of the United States to assert its jurisdiction in air space over the high seas
based upon the right of self-defense or protection of customs. Specifically, the United States has
established Air Defense Identification Zones which require all aircraft to file position reports when
approaching the United States. The United States has also asserted limited jurisdiction on the high
seas in prescribing danger zone regulations. 33 C.F.R. §§ 204.1 - 204.232 (1971). However, both
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In many respects mariculture represents a new ocean use that has not
previously been considered by international law and clearly is not recog-
nized by "general principles of international law." However, this nov-
elty does not mean that mariculture is prohibited or that mariculture
could never be recognized. Because serious legal consideration of mari-
culture on the open seas will not come until its technology is further
developed, the problem of the method of recognition becomes impor-
tant.
International conventions do not establish an express procedure for
the recognition of a new use; however, customary international law
suggests one method. Customary international law itself consists of a
constantly evolving set of norms that receive recognition as having legal
status. Within this area of customary international law, many of the
initial moves toward legal recognition of new practices have been ac-
complished by "unilateral action." '67 Because principles of customary
international law may dictate the fate of mariculture on the high seas,
a discussion of the operation of those principles or rules is in order.
International law has traditionally been customary law, for it is the
product of the consciences of state rather than the will of a political
superior."" By the term custom, international law refers to "a clear and
continuous habit of doing certain actions [which] has grown up under
the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to interna-
tional law, obligatory or right."'69 Custom is distinguishable from prac-
tices7 ° or usages' because the habit of doing these actions has grown
up with the conviction that these actions are obligatory or right.' As
discussed above,'73 international law has no settled answers with respect
to conducting mariculture activities in ocean areas.
examples involve considerations of national security. The development of a commercial ocean use
lacks the national security justification.
" HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 96. See also Truman Proclamation. The Truman Proclamation
was the major impetus to the development of the current legal regime governing the continental
shelf. In part, it subjected the natural resources of the continental shelf to United States jurisdiction
and control. The President justified this extension based upon the desire to exploit natural re-
sources, the need for some legal regime to direct activities and the physical proximity of the
continental shelf.
'ID. O'CONNELL, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1965). See generally C. JENCKS, A NEW WORLD
OF LAW 137-39 (1969).
111L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 26.
"
7 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 9. "The term 'practice' is used to indicate the aggregation
of steps which are formative of law, whereas the term 'custom' is reserved for the law itself." Id.
1
71L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, at 26. The term usage denotes a habit of doing certain actions
which has grown up without the conviction that these actions are obligatory.
1721d.
1'7See p. 329 supra.
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Customary international law remains in constant flux. 74 In particu-
lar, the law of the sea has developed and is developing from customary
law. Professor Myres McDougal describes the law of the sea as a deci-
sion making process; a process of continuous interaction, of continuous
demand and response in which unilateral and competing claims are
weighed and appraised by decision makers external to the demanding
state in terms of the interest of the world community and of the rival
claimants. 7' To determine whether this process can incorporate new
maritime uses, several questions need to be answered: (1) what elements
are required for the establishment of a principle of customary
international law; (2) can the United States or American nationals uni-
laterally adopt a new practice; and (3) how are new uses reconciled with
existing uses?
International jurists cannot agree on any listing of elements required
for the establishment of a principle of customary international law. 76
In his working paper for the International Law Commission, Hudson,
the reporter for the Commission, listed the following requirements for
the establishment of a principle of customary international law: concor-
dant practice by a number of States with reference to a type of situation
falling within the domain of international relations; continuation or
repetition of the practice over a considerable period of time; conception
that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing interna-
tional law; and general acquiescence in the practice by other States. 77
This was later omitted from the International Law Commission Re-
port. 17 Wilfred Jenks suggested that the rejection was based on Hud-
son's requirement for repetition of the practice over long periods of
time. 71 The International Law Commission recognized the potential
and the need for "instant" or "spontaneous" custom." No interna-
tional body has legislated with respect to mariculture activities; there-
fore, the problem of instant custom is not present with respect to
7
'HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 96.
"'McDougal, supra note 161, at 356-57.
1'D. O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 17; C. JENKS, supra note 168, at 140-143.
'Report, International Law Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN
4/16 (1950).
" Report, International Law Commission, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 364, U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950). D. O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 17.
171C. JENKS, supra note 168, at 142.
' Id. at 142-6. The notoriety and continuity of practice necessary to preserve general acquiesci-
ence no longer requires duration of considerable periods of time. Modern communications have
made transmission immediate. Also, the United Nations General Assembly exists as a supra-
national legislating body. The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space demonstrates the legislative capacity of the General
Assembly. Note, 4 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 159, 168 n.69 (1974).
19741
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
mariculture. The mariculture practices, to be recognized as legally bind-
ing, will have to be conducted and repeated over a "considerable"' 81
period of time.
American nationals can conduct mariculture activities in ocean areas
subject to the competing rights of foreign parties.'82 Both the United
States and foreign States have to defer to the practice before it will be
recognized as legally binding. In determining the status of the practice,
the International Court of Justice has looked for general rather than
national practices and for positive actions in preference to mere absten-
tion from action."" The party relying upon customary law has the
burden of establishing that the practice is binding on the other party. 8 '
The United States, arguing on behalf of a mariculturist and defending
his use of part of the high sea, would have to prove that opposing States
had accepted the legal presence of the mariculture activity. 8 ' To meet
this burden of proof it must be shown that ships of the States in question
made appropriate adjustments in the usual course of travel; that fisher-
men refrained from fishing in that area; and that these actions were
taken in recognition of a right appertaining to the United States or to
the individual. 86
3. Limitations on Mariculture Practice
All activities upon the high seas, including new uses such as proposed
in this article, must be undertaken with reasonable regard to the inter-
ests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. The
reasonableness of a use can be regarded from the standard of the na-
tional interest being advanced, the benefit occuring from that conduct
to both the national and the world economy, the harm done to existing
interests, and the possibility of another less costly alternative. Recent
bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding fisheries resources have
recognized in principle the importance to national interests of existing
fisheries in areas formerly thought to be within the high seas.'87
"'Id. at 142. No definite time limits exist for what is a "considerable" period of time.
" See p. 330 supra.
'"Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [19271 P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 10; D. O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at
18.
'See Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [19501 I.C.J. 266, 276.
''D. O'CONNELL, supra note 168, at 20-21.
"'See id.
'See Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-242; 87 Stat. 1061; Shrimp Conserva-
tion Agreement with Brazil, May 9, 1972, 67 DEPT. STATE BULL. No. Ill (1972); Agreement
Between Iceland and the United Kingdom Concerning Fishing Rights, November 13, 1973, 12
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1315; Agreement Between Iceland and Norway Concerning Fisheries, July
10, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1313; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
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The threat to national well-being was a prime factor in justifying the
recognition of these extended zones.8" The recent treaty with respect to
the Baltic Sea recognizes the practices of artificial reproduction and
transplantation of fish and other living organisms as a step toward
insuring maximum and stable production. "9 The benefit to national
interests and expansion of fisheries resources both serve to justify mar-
culture practices. Among the arguments justifying this new use are the
observations that mariculture is a modern complement to traditional
fishing practices; that mariculture would augment rather than deplete
fish stocks,'"" that mariculture would permit the maximum use of the
ocean as a source of food;'9' and that mariculture will increase domestic
food supplies at a time of food shortages.
To be considered as acceptable conduct, mariculture cannot unrea-
sonably interfere with other national claims to the high seas." 2 Possible
conflicts with navigational uses and the laying of cables or pipelines can
be avoided by careful selection of the mariculture site. Mariculture
should in no way conflict with the right to fly over the high seas. The
ocean use posing the greatest potential for conflict with mariculture is
that of existing traditional fisheries, because the new enterprise may
result in excluding fishermen from a small area formerly used or trav-
ersed by fishermen. However, the question is whether mariculture will
unreasonably interfere with existing fishing practices. As Kane notes,
mariculture is a breeding process, the existing fish population will not
be depleted and mariculture will probably be confined to a small
area. 1:1
A problem may still arise if a mariculturist proposes to locate in the
midst of an existing fishing area. In such a situation, the conflict should
be resolved by considering (I) the probable benefit, both short-term and
long-range, to the mariculturist from locating at such a site; (2) the
probable short-term and long-term losses the fisherman will suffer; and
(3) the availability of other suitable sites for the mariculture activity. In
resolving this conflict, an international arbitral tribunal or court should
Resources in the Baltic Sea and the Belts, done Sept. 13, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/C.I/1035, 12 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'IS 1291.
'MSee Arctic waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, 18-19 Eliz. 2, c.47 (Can.) at 653 (1970).
' Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea, art. 10(e),
done Sept. 13, 1973, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1035, 12 INT'L LFGAl. MAT'LS 1291.
'"T. KANE, supra note 7, at 65.
1'Id.: but see M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 6, at 764.
"'Convcntion on the High Seas, art. 2. See also McDougal, Law of High Seas in Time of Peace,
3 DENVER J. INT'i. LAW & Pot.icy 47 (1973).
"
1 T. KANE., supra note 7, at 65-66.
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also weigh the speculative nature of any mariculture venture and the
need for accommodating new scientific technologies.
D. Submerged Lands and the Continental Shelf
International rules define ocean waters in different terms than those
used to define the ocean bottom. International law divides the ocean
bottom into areas within or beyond national jurisdiction. National juris-
diction over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf extends
beyond the territorial sea to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the water permits exploitation of the natural
resources of such areas.'94 If the continental shelf extends beyond the
territorial seas, the coastal nation does not have sovereign jurisdiction
over the superjacent waters. 9 ' Because the territorial zone and the conti-
nental shelf are defined without relation to each other, they are analyzed
under separate headings in this article.
There are two principal questions relating to the creation of a mari-
culture facility on the continental shelf.' 9 For purposes of this initial
discussion, the term continental shelf includes submerged lands as that
term is used in the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act;9 7 however, a distinction between the terms will be
drawn in the discussion of the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia. The
first question is whether, under current international law, the United
States has the authority to permit construction 99 of the facility, and the
second is whether the State of Georgia has authority to permit construc-
tion of the facility. A parallel issue is whether either or both governmen-
tal bodies have authority to regulate the mariculture operation.'99
Among other factors, the degree of attachment to the seabed differen-
tiates mariculture from other uses of the high seas. Fishing and naviga-
tional uses are only temporarily in contact with the seabed. A relatively
permanent connection of a mariculture facility to the seabed, in addition
to a surface presence, and exclusion of other potential users, would
"'Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1.
"'Id. art. 3. Article 3 of the Convention provides that:
The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not affect the legal statute
of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters.
"'HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 99.
"'Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1970): Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
" See generally van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5. This discussion treats legal
problems associated with permitting and denying construction. While the legal considerations
differ, both considerations represent extensions of coastal state jurisdiction.
"99d.
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characterize proposed mariculture projects.00 For those reasons, mari-
culture could also be considered a use of the continental shelf. There-
fore, mariculture will have to be reconciled with the legal regime govern-
ing the continental shelf.
I. Coastal State Authority
United States exercise of jurisdiction over the continental shelf is
governed by the Continental Shelf Convention.2 ' This Convention pro-
vides that coastal nations may exercise sovereign rights over the conti-
nental shelf for the purposes of exploration and exploitation of the
natural resources present in the continental shelf land's102 The term
natural resources is defined to include mineral and other nonliving re-
sources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belong-
ing to sedentary species. °3 Sedentary species are, at the harvestable
stage, immobile on or under the seabed, or are unable to move except
in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.2 14 "[T]he
coastal state is entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the
continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its explo-
ration and exploitation of its natural resources .... 1205 The coastal
state also may take measures necessary for the protection of the installa-
tion .206
The question arises whether, within the rules recognized by the Con-
vention, the United States has the authority to permit construction of a
mariculture facility that will be attached to the continental shelf'? Two
different interpretations can be given the Continental Shelf Conven-
ti6n.207 An accepted maxim of statutory interpretation is expressio unius
est exclusio alterius .2 1 This rule of statutory interpretation would re-
, "See HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 100.
2 Convention on the Continental Shelf.
21d. art. 2(l).
'"Ild. art. 2(4).
10ld. This definition clearly includes crabs and oysters and similar crustacea and shellfish. See
4 WHITEMAN INTERNATIONAL LAW 858-865 (1965).
2
"
0Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(2).
211ld. Notice must be given of the construction of any surface installation and a permanent
warning must be attached. Id. art. 5(5).
20'HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 101-108.2
M Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924); Macon v. Walker, 204 Ga. 810, 57 S.E.2d 633
(1949). See generally District of Columbia National Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808
(D.C. Cir. 1965); A. LENHOFF, LEGISLATION 690-701 (1949); Hunt, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius -- Application by Custom, 19 FLORIDA L.J. 199 (1945); Williams, Expressio Unius Est
Exclusio Alterius. 15 MARO. L. REV. 191 (1931). This maxim means the expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of another. The use of the maxim is not intended to indicate that a court
necessarily would use this rule of statutory interpretation rather that a court would have this rule
available for construing the convention.
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strict the coastal state's jurisdiction to only natural resource extractive
activities. 09 An alternative interpretation can be given favoring expand-
ing the meaning of the term "natural resources." This approach would
include under such term "virtually any use of the seabed, for the seabed
itself is a resource of value in the economic sense if any commercial or
governmental enterprise depends upon the use, either permanently or
temporarily, of some portion thereof." 10 Neither interpretation has
been adopted by international or United States courts;2 " however, sev-
eral commentators favor the latter interpretation"' which would permit
the United States to authorize the construction of mariculture facilities.
Coastal nations have successfully asserted jurisdiction over the con-
tiental shelf to prohibit unlicensed users. In United States v. Ray,"' the
United States Court of Appeals upheld an injunction obtained by the
United States Government to prevent certain entrepreneurs from con-
structing an articifical island attached to coral reefs on the continental
shelf under the high seas off the Florida coast." 4 The court determined
that construction of the island facility would interfere with the rights of
the United States to explore and exploit the natural resources of the
continental shelf."' The Dutch Government has similarly prevented the
construction of offshore installations." 6 The Dutch legislation" 7 was
specifically aimed at the construction and operation of pirate radio
stations. Based upon three separate legal arguments: the vacuum
theory,218 the protection of national interests, and the notion of contigu-
"HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 101.
21
"
0 d. at 103.
1"Cf North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3. Although the International Court of
Justice did not rule on this point, dicta in the opinion has been interpreted to accord with this
position. In the Louisiana Superport Studies, the authors interpret this dicta to indicate that the
authority of the coastal state only extends to the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.
HERSHMAN, supra note 13 at 102-103.
2 2See HERSHMAN, supra note 13 at 108; T. KANE, supra note 7, at 28-29; van Panhuys & van
Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 337-38.
213423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
2
"Id. at 22-23.
2 1ld.
"
6See van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5.
"'North Sea Installations Act of December 3, 1964, [19641 STAATSBLAD 447. English translation
of the text may be found at 60 A.J.I.L. 340-41 (1966).
"'Van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5, at 332-333. The vacuum theory is based upon
the assumption that international law, and more particularly its rules concerning the freedom of
the seas, may never be deemed to accord private persons or enterprises a right to create places not
subject to the jurisdiction of any state. If structures are constructed upon the high seas, then a
question arises regarding the legal rules governing the structure. To avoid a legal vacuum, any flag
state or other state whose interests are likely to be affected has a right to extend its jurisdiction to
such structures. In dealing with the pirate broadcasting facilities, the Dutch government argued
that, as long as no international arrangement has been concluded regarding jurisdiction over all
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ity,2'5 the Dutch Government extended its jurisdiction over foreign non-
extractive facilities attached to the continental shelf.20 The practice of
the Dutch Government supports the conclusion that the United States
may prohibit the construction of mariculture facilities on the continental
shelf."2 '
However, the converse, that the United States could permit a com-
mercial mariculture activity, does not necessarily follow. An examina-
tion of some existing federal statutes may indicate probable limitations
on United States authority in this area. The United States Government
controls licensing of mineral extractive processes on the outer continen-
tal shelf. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act claimed the outer shelf
to be subject to United States jurisdiction, control, and power of dispo-
sition.222 Congress did not claim the right to exercise sovereign rights
over the outer shelf.223 Because of the limited nature of the federal
claim, existing legislation as to the extent of the powers conferred upon
government agencies must be strictly construed.2 4 The Act gives the
Secretary of the Interior authority to lease the outer shelf,22 but men-
tions only oil, gas, sulphur, and other minerals in its dispositive provi-
sions.22" However, an argument can be made that the Secretary of the
Interior has authority to lease lands for nonextractive purposes. 27 In
leasing lands for such purposes, the United States would be taking
unilateral action.228 As indicated in the discussion of the high seas, 9 a
fixed installations on the high seas, the nearest coastal state was also competent to extend the
exercise of its jurisdiction to any installations on its continental shelf in order to prevent the
continued existence of a legal vacuum thereon.
1
'"Id. at 337.
2201d. at 337-38. The authors conclude "that the action taken was based upon a new rule of
international law, which, summarized, provides that a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction over
all installations erected on the soil of its continental shelf, no matter for what purpose." Id. at 338.
However, this conclusion goes to the other aspect of the question; that is, whether the United States
has the authority to regulate mariculture operations. This conclusion does not hold that United
States would have authority to license the construction of a mariculture facility in the first instance.
2 See generally van Panhuys & van Emde Boas, supra note 5.
"'Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
"
2
"Id.: Stang, supra note 31, at 165-67.
224Stang, supra note 31, at 167.
nOuter Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1970).
ld. 1331-1343 (1970); Stang, supra note 31, at 187.
"'Compare HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 108 with Stang, supra note 31 at 187. Stang contends
that:
No executive agent of the U.S. Government has yet been given the authority to lease
the outer Shelf for other purposes, including that of building a resort on Triumph Reef
or Cortes Bank, or a Hydro-Lab or fish farm anywhere else on the Shelf.
Id. See also Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1970).
2 HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 108.
"z'See p. 329 supra.
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reasonableness standard would control actions taken by the United
States.
2. Federal-State Authority
As discussed above,"a° international law recognizes the authority of
the coastal state over its adjacent continental shelf. The Submerged
Lands Act 3' transferred to the states jurisdiction over a portion of the
continental shelf. The Act established title in the states to the beds of
marginal seas extending seaward three geographical miles in width from
their coast lines. 32 This conveyance was qualified by the control the
federal government continued to exercise for navigation2 3 and other
purposes which included authority to prevent obstructions in the naviga-
ble waters of the United States. Therefore, the construction of a mar-
culture facility in the waters of the United States would have to be
authorized by the Secretary of the Army. 34
Georgia law currently permits the licensing of mineral exploration
beneath the territorial seas. Formerly, the Mineral Leasing Commission
had the authority to issue permits for the exploration and exploitation
':"See p. 337 supra.
23143 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
2Id. 1311-1315.233Id. § 1311 (d).
1
31See Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it shall
not, be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir,
breakwater, bulkhead, jetty or other structure in any port, roadstead, haven, harbor,
canal, navigable river or any other water of the United States, outside established harbor
lines or where no harbor lines have been established, except on plans recommended by
the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army.
Although the United States Coast Guard has priinary responsibility for safety of navigation, 14
U.S.C. § 2 (1970), the United States Army Corps of Engineers is charged with the responsibility
for issuing permits for installations in United States waters. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970. With respect
to mariculture facilities, the Coast Guard may promulgate regulations with respect to lights and
warning devices. As indicated by the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Army Corps of Engineers has
primary responsibility with respect to any obstruction to navigation. A Department of the Army
pamphlet, Permits for Work in Navigable Waters, outlines the policy guidelines followed by the
Army Corps of Engineers in granting permits:
The decision as to whether a permit will be issued must rest primarily upon the effect
of the proposed work on navigation. This includes authority to deny any application of
a proposed structure obviously not designed to withstand wave action or other forces
and may collapse and create hazards to navigation. The Corps of Engineers cannot effect
the location of structures except that permits may be denied if it appears that they will
be so located as to unreasonably obstruct navigation. However, in cases where the
structure is unobjectionable from the standpoint of navigation, but when State or local
authorities decline to give their consent to the work, it is not usual for the Corps of
Engineers to issue a permit . . .
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of submerged lands. 35 Under the Governmental Reorganization Act of
1972, the State Properties Control Commission is not responsible for
all functions formerly performed by the Mineral Leasing Commis-
sion.""6 The Commission has authority to lease to any person the min-
eral resources located on State owned lands. The terms and conditions
of the lease shall include, but not be limited to, the exclusive right to
drill, dredge, and mine for mineral resources and to produce and appro-
priate any and all of same.23 As the statute indicates, the State Proper-
ties Control Commission does not have the authority to lease submerged
lands for nonextractive uses.239
II. SUMMARY
Coastal nations have regulated activities in ocean areas more than
three miles seaward. However, coastal nations have not authorized new
uses unrelated to exploitation of natural resources.24 Current interna-
tional law neither permits or prohibits a coastal state from permitting
construction of a mariculture facility in an area beyond its territorial
waters.2"'
During the interim until changes in the Law of the Sea Convention
are adopted, the position of the United States regarding nonextractive
uses in the area beyond three miles remains unsettled. Congress could
amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to expressly provide for
the leasing of the seabed for nonextractive uses, such as mariculture.
However, any such an amendment would expand the quantum of au-
thority that the United States exercises over the area beyond its terri-
torial sea. In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and in subsequent
legislation, the Congress has been particularly sensitive to not claiming
"'[19651 Ga. L. 590, 591, as amended GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3561 (Supp. 1973).
'"GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3561 (Supp. 1973).
131GA. CODE ANN. § 91-1 10a(b) (Supp. 1973).
r'1GA. CODE ANN. § 91-1 10(a)(b)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1973).
""'See discussion of the principle exclusio unius est exclusio alterius, supra note 208. The
Georgia State Games and Fish Commission can lease to any citizens of Georgia or any Georgia
lirm or corporation portions of the oyster beds or bottoms. GA. CODE ANN. 45-907 (1957). No
lease shall issue unless the person, firm or corporation has demonstrated to the commission
willingness, ability and intention to comply with the laws and regulations governing oyster bed
cultivation. Id. The authors feel the principles of statutory construction used in Macon v. Walker,
204 Ga. 810, 57 S.E.2d 633 (1949) may be applied to the oyster bed leasing statute. This construc-
tion would limit the authority of the Georgia State Game and Fish Commission to leasing sub-
merged land only for the purpose of oyster cultivation and would not extend to leasing for other
forms of mariculture.
2
"Knight, Non-Extractive Uses of the Seabed, 6 MARINE TECHNOLOGY SOCIETY Journal (No.
3) 18 (1972).
2
1'HERSHMAN, supra note 13, at 114.
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sovereignty over this region. 4 The legislative history of the Marine
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 demonstrates the
limits of authority claimed by the United States. Title III of the Act
deals with the establishment of marine sanctuaries in waters beyond the
three mile limit. The Senate Commerce Committee initially rejected this
title because the range of domestic authority beyond the territorial sea
was narrow, the sovereign rights that the United States exercises over
the resources of the resources of the continental shelf do not extend to
the superjacent waters and United States jurisdiction does not extend
to foreign citizens in high seas areas.2 43 The Commerce Committee felt
that narrow geographical claims were in the best interests of all mari-
time nations. 44 The Committee on Conference adopted language re-
flecting these concerns. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctu-
aries Act, as adopted, limits the application of United States jurisdiction
to foreign citizens and ships. The federal regulations will be applied only
in accordance with recognized principles of international law.245 In light
of this legislative background, the Congress may be reluctant to assert
greater United States authority over the area beyond three miles.
This analysis indicates that Georgia could, under authority of an
appropriate state mariculture statute, lease lands between the low-water
line and a point three miles seaward for nonextractive uses. Interna-
tional law recognizes the qualified sovereignty a coastal nation exercises
over both the continental shelf and territorial waters. Nations have the
authority in the ocean area within three miles of their coast to permit
mariculture activities on the ocean floor and in the adjacent waters. In
the Submerged Lands Act, the United States Government conveyed
much of its claim over the continental shelf and the superjacent waters
to the various states. The State of Georgia can exercise authority over
activities in this area subject to competing national and international
navigational rights and to the authority over navigation exercised by the
Army Corps of Engineers.
The 1974 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea will
expressly consider the question of jurisdiction over nonextractive uses
of the seabed and adjacent water column. Presumably, that conference
will reach a conclusion on this question.
"'Comment, Continental Shelf Law: Outdistanced by Science and Technology, 31 LA. L. REV.
108, 114-18 (1970).
"IS. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1972).
21 1d. at 9.
"'nMarine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 302(g), Pub. L. 92-532, 86 Stat.
1052 (1972).
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